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Director, Military Law and the Law of War Review*
On 7 July 2011, the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber) 
issued two judgments in cases brought against the UK with regard to the 
conduct of its forces in Iraq: Al-Jedda v. UK (Application No. 27021/08) 
and Al-Skeini. UK (Application No. 55721/07). The judgments address 
several issues that are of key importance for the applicability and 
relevance of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to/
for military operations abroad and for the implications of the ECHR for 
such operations when it does apply, as well as the relationship between 
the ECHR on the one hand, and UN Security Council resolutions and 
international humanitarian law on the other hand.
Al-Jedda concerns detention by UK forces in Iraq after the occupation 
phase and gave rise to two main questions: (i) was the conduct of these 
forces attributable to the UK or to the UN?; and (ii) did UN Security 
Council Resolution 1546 (8 June 2004) justify/permit detention in 
circumstances not covered by Article 5 ECHR (on deprivation of liberty) 
and therefore displace, qualify, or derogate from, this ECHR provision? 
The judgment also touches upon the relationship between the ECHR and 
international humanitarian law. The Court decided that the conduct was 
attributable to the UK; that Resolution 1546 did not explicitly impose 
measures violating Article 5 ECHR; and that the latter fully applied. It 
concluded that the UK had breached Article 5 ECHR.
Al-Skeini concerns the death of six Iraqis during the period of British 
occupation: five as a result of shootings and one in detention. The main 
questions in this case were (i) the scope of extraterritorial application 
of the ECHR; and (ii) the scope and extent of the duty to investigate 
possible breaches of Article 2 ECHR (the right to life) as a consequence
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of the conduct of armed forces in an occupied territory, where 
international humanitarian law (also) applies. The Court found that all 
six Iraqis were within the jurisdiction of the UK and that the ECHR 
was therefore applicable. It then held that the duty to investigate deaths 
at hands of State agents applies even in occupations or armed conflicts 
and that this duty had been violated in five of the six cases. 
Given the importance of these cases for military operations, the 
editorial board is pleased that we have been able to include in this 
issue an agora on these judgments, offering a range of perspectives by 
Heike Krieger, Francesco Messineo, Kjetil Mujezinovic Larsen and 
Anne-Marie Baldovin. Anne-Marie Baldovin’s contribution (written in 
French) covers both cases and deals with most of the above-mentioned 
aspects. By contrast, the contributions by Francesco Messineo and Kjetil 
Mujezinovic Larsen both focus specifically on attribution. The latter 
also addresses extraterritorial derogations. That issue is dealt with more 
extensively in Heike Krieger’s contribution. That contribution examines 
in particular the relationship between the ECHR and international 
humanitarian law.
As this is only an introduction and not a full contribution, I will 
refrain from adding my own detailed analysis of the two judgments.1 
Nevertheless, I cannot resist offering some brief reflections. 
1. In the light of the definition of occupation under international 
humanitarian law and the Court’s previous case-law on occupied 
territories and territories controlled by or through armed forces, it 
can hardly come as a surprise that, in Al-Skeini, the Court found that 
the ECHR did apply to the conduct of UK forces in Iraq during the 
occupation phase (as regards the shooting incidents, it did so contrary 
to the conclusions reached by the British courts, which found that the 
ECHR only applied to the detention case2). However, that the Court 
arrives at this conclusion on the basis of ‘State agent authority and 
control’ rather than effective control over territory (§ 149) is arguably 
1 My views on most of the issues concerned, including on the House of Lords 
judgments in both cases, are set out in F. Naert, International Law Aspects of the 
EU’s Security and Defence Policy, with a Particular Focus on the Law of Armed 
Conflict and Human Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010), especially pp. 499-526 
and 541-658.
2 See House of Lords, R (Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence, 
13 June 2006, [2007] UKHL 26, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld200607/ldjudgmt/jd070613/skeini-1.pdf (incl. references to the lower courts’ 
findings).
317
MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW 50/3-4 (2011)
less obvious and may be significant for incidents involving the use of 
force in other situations. 
2. In Al-Skeini the Court attempted to set out systematically its view 
on the extraterritorial scope of application of the ECHR (§§ 130-142). 
Whether or not one agrees with the Court’s views and reasoning, e.g. on 
the different categories/scenarios, the judgment provides at least some 
clarification as to where the Court stands on this issue. 
3. The Court’s acceptance in this scheme that the ECHR rights can be 
‘divided and tailored’ (§ 137) is a welcome and major departure from 
what it held in Bankovic.3 
4. As argued by several of the contributions in this agora, the test for 
attribution may still not be entirely clear, in particular as the Court, in 
Al-Jedda, did not openly overrule the ‘ultimate authority and control’ 
test which it applied in Behrami and Saramati4. Nevertheless, in Al-
Jedda the Court’s reasoning and decision are undoubtedly more in 
conformity with the attribution rules under international law than those 
in Behrami and Saramati and clearly correspond better to reality. One 
might expect that even if the Behrami and Saramati test survives, in 
the future it will only apply and be met very exceptionally.
5. The (arguably excessive) deference which the Court showed for the 
UN Security Council in Behrami and Saramati has made room for a 
very critical attitude in Al-Jedda. This might in part be explained by the 
European Union’s Court of Justice’s similarly critical attitude.5 It seems 
natural for the Court not to assume too readily that, in its resolutions, the 
Security Council intended to permit or impose derogations from human 
rights law. However, having regard to the quite specific language on 
3 Grand Chamber, Vlastimir and Borka Bankovic and others against Belgium, and 
others (Application No. 52207/99), decision on admissibility, 12 December 2001, 
§ 75.
4 Grand Chamber, Behrami and Behrami v. France (Application No. 71412/01) 
and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway (Application No. 78166/01), 
(joined) decision on admissibility, 31 May 2007. In this decision, the conduct 
of the NATO-led operation KFOR in Kosovo was attributed to the UN which, 
according to the Court, exercised ultimate authority and control over it, through 
the Security Council.
5 That case is referred to in the Al-Jedda judgment, §§ 51-53. See Case C-402/05 P, 
Kadi v. Council and Commission, 3 September 2008. This judgment overturned 
the Court of First Instance’s judgment in this case. That court, now renamed the 
General Court, has, however, continued to express dissenting views: see Case 
T-85/09, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Commission, judgment of 30 September 2010 
(appeal pending: see joined cases C-584/10, 593/10 and 595/10).
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security detention in the letter annexed to Resolution 1546, the Court 
arguably goes rather far in interpreting the Security Council’s intention. 
The Court also gives a very narrow reading of when obligations under 
the UN Charter conflict with and prevail over the ECHR.
6. The previous observation has significant implications for security 
detention in military operations, at least in cases whether international 
humanitarian law does not apply. I fully share Heike Krieger’s 
assessment that European States desiring to conduct such detentions in 
operations abroad will either need to seek an explicit Security Council 
mandate to derogate from human rights obligations that prohibit such 
detention or will have to formally declare a derogation under Article 
15 ECHR.6 I consider that the latter would be legally possible.7 It will 
be interesting to see whether and how the Copenhagen process on the 
Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations8 (to which 
the Court refers in § 58) will address these implications. Furthermore, 
the judgment does not offer any guidance as to the extent to which any 
derogation would be permissible, notably on what procedural safeguards 
would have to be put in place as a minimum.9
6 In the absence of a derogation being declared and invoked, the Court has 
applied the ECHR in full also in other cases of armed conflict or serious internal 
disturbances, see e.g. Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia (Applications 
Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00) and Isayeva v. Russia (Application No. 
57950/00), both judgments of 24 February 2005.
7 See F. Naert, supra note 1, pp. 577-580. While several law lords were skeptical 
in this respect (House of Lords, Al-Jedda, R (on the application of) v Secretary of 
State for Defence, 12 December 2007, [2007] UKHL 58, http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd071212/jedda.pdf, §§ 38, 132 and 150), 
the Court seems to leave open this possibility in § 100 of the Al-Jedda judgment. 
Note that before the House of Lords, the UK Government did not accept that it 
could not have derogated (§ 38 of the House of Lord judgment).
8 For the start of this process, see Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Legal Service, 
Copenhagen Conference on ‘The Handling of Detainees in International Military 
Operations’, 11 - 12 October 2007, Non-Paper on Legal Framework and Aspects 
of Detention, 4 October 2007 with accompanying note on the ‘Copenhagen 
Process on The Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations’, 
published in Vol. 46 (2007) of this Review, pp. 363-392.
9 This point was quite rightly raised by Baroness Hale in the House of Lord 
judgment (supra note 7), §§ 126-129, albeit in relation to the extent of the 
derogation under Resolution 1546 (‘The right is qualified but not displaced. ... 
The right is qualified only to the extent required or authorised by the resolution. 
What remains of it thereafter must be observed. This may have both substantive 
and procedural consequences’). Similarly, in that judgment Lord Carswell took 
the view that the power to intern ‘has to be exercised in such a way as to minimise 
the infringements of the detainee’s rights under article 5(1) ..., in particular by 
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7. These judgments clarify to some extent the relationship between 
the ECHR and international humanitarian law, which the Court has 
only recently explicitly addressed. In particular, in Varnava the Court 
stated that ‘Article 2 must be interpreted in so far as possible in light 
of the general principles of international law, including the rules of 
international humanitarian law’ (emphasis added).10 The way in which 
the Court rather summarily dismisses security detention under the 
law of occupation in paragraph 107 of Al-Jedda raises the question 
whether it does not impose rather strict limits on the degree to which 
interpretation of the ECHR in the light of international humanitarian 
law is possible,11 and whether it will accept the partial displacement of 
ECHR rights in case of conflict with rules of international humanitarian 
law, in those cases in which the lex specialis principle would justify 
this. The Court’s findings in Al-Skeini clearly imply that the right to life 
adopting and operating to the fullest practicable extent safeguards of the nature 
of those to which I referred ... above’ (§ 136), i.e. ‘the compilation of intelligence 
about such persons which is as accurate and reliable as possible, the regular review 
of the continuing need to detain each person and a system whereby that need and 
the underlying evidence can be checked and challenged by representatives on 
behalf of the detained persons, so far as is practicable and consistent with the 
needs of national security and the safety of other persons’ (§ 130). See also the 
lower court judgment: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division), The 
Queen (on the application of Hilal Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of 
State for Defence, 29 March 2006, [2006] EWCA Civ 327, § 87, http://www.
bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/327.html.
10 Varnava and Others v. Turkey, 18 September 2009 (Applications Nos. 16064/90, 
16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 
16073/90), § 185.
11 This prompts the question to what extent the Court’s views might be specific to 
internment in occupied teritory (and by extension perhaps to internment of enemy 
civilans in a State’s own territory in an international armed conflict), for which the 
question whether the rules of international humanitarian law can remain entirely 
unaffected by subsequent developments in human rights law may be more open 
than it is as regards the internment of prisoners of war. In fact, the European 
Commission on Human Rights appears to have distinguished between both in one 
of its early Cyprus cases: see the Report of 10 July 1976 in Cyprus v. Turkey, 4 
E.H.R.R. 1982, pp. 482-582, especially pp. 529-533 and 555-559, including points 
II.2-3 of the conclusions in Part IV. In particular, it did not deem it necessary to 
inquire whether the internment of prisoners of war by Turkey was compatible 
with Article 5 ECHR because this was regulated by international humanitarian 
law (§ 313). In contrast, with regard to interned civilians, it held that Article 5 
ECHR was violated (§ 310) and did not refer to international humanitarian law on 
this point. It concluded that there was a violation of Article 5 ECHR with regard 
to the detention of civilians and that it was not necessary to examine whether 
Article 5 had been violated by the internment of prisoners of war (see also the 
contribution by Heike Krieger on this case).
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under the ECHR continues to apply even in situations of occupation, 
subject only to derogation in respect of deaths resulting from lawful 
acts of war (§ 162). However, the case does not deal with the legality 
of the use of force itself but only with the duty to investigate cases 
involving deaths imputable to State agents. The Court held that this 
procedural obligation continues to apply also in armed conflict and 
occupation (§ 164). 
8. Al-Skeini addresses the scope and extent of the duty to investigate 
possible breaches of Article 2 ECHR in an occupation. The Court 
accepted that there may be constraints to such investigations in 
these circumstances but stressed the requirements of independence, 
reasonable expedition and sufficient public scrutiny (§§ 164-167) and 
found that five of the six investigations in this case did not meet the 
ECHR requirements (§§ 168-177). It also stated that civil proceedings 
undertaken on the initiative of next-of-kin which do not involve the 
identification or punishment of any alleged perpetrator are not sufficient, 
nor is merely awarding damages (§ 165). No doubt there will be 
discussion over whether the Court struck an acceptable balance and 
whether it set realistic standards. In this context, it should be noted that 
the UK accepted that for three of the cases the investigations fell short 
of what is required under the ECHR (§ 171). 
Clearly, both judgments do not finally settle several of the issues raised. 
In any event, I hope our readers will enjoy the four contributions in this 
agora, and that this agora will feed their reflections on the implications 
of the two judgments for military operations.
